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We examine the role played by Mutual Guarantee Institutions (MGIs) in the lending policies undertaken by 
banks at the peak of the Great Crisis of 2007-2009. We address this issue by using a large database on 
Italian firms built from the credit files of UniCredit banking Group and focusing on small business. We 
provide an empirical analysis of the determinants of the probability that a borrowing firm will  suffer 
financial tension and obtain two main innovative findings. First, we show that small firms supported by 
MGIs were less likely to experience financial tensions even at that time of utmost financial stress. Second, 
our empirical evidence shows that MGIs have played a signalling role beyond the simple provision of a 
collateral. This latter finding suggests that the information provided by MGIs turned out to be key for bank-
firm  relations as  scoring and rating systems  – being typically based on pro-cyclical indicators  – had 
become less informative during the crisis.  
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1  Introduction 
We bring together two different strands of literature related to the extent of financial 
constraints. First, given the existing state of the firm-bank relationship, we ask whether 
the support of external institutions may help ease those financial constraints. Second, we 
address that issue within the specific context of the Great Crisis of 2007-2009. 
On the first matter, the literature often recognizes that borrowers’ access to credit may 
benefit from the assistance of Mutual Guarantee Institutions (MGIs). However, it is not 
clear through which channel that beneficial effect materializes. On one hand, the bank 
could simply value the guarantee offered by the MGI to the borrowing firm, which would 
reduce both the probability of default and the loss given default. In this sense, the MGI 
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guarantee acts merely as a collateral available to the bank vis-à-vis that borrower. On the 
other hand, the bank might interpret the MGI guarantee as an important signal of the 
good quality of the firm. Indeed, the MGI has access to private information on the firm 
beyond what the bank can normally see and if the MGI grants its guarantee to that firm it 
is implicitly revealing to the bank that such private information is good. 
On  the  second  matter,  the  Great  Crisis  of  2007-09  brought  about  extreme  financial 
instability, especially after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, by mid-September 2008. 
That wave of instability kept aggravating during the rest of 2008. The acute difficulty 
they  had  to  obtain  funding  on  the  wholesale  markets  induced  the  banks  to  become 
particularly reluctant to maintain their supply of credit at the previous levels, let alone 
granting new loans. So, there is evidence the banks curtailed credit supply by the end of 
2008  and  that  the  adjustment  reached  its  climax  during  the  first  half  of  2009.  Even 
though,  given  the  concurrent  drop  in  demand,  most  enterprises  postponed  their 
investment projects or even cut their production levels, the resulting drop in the demand 
for credit was much less than the drop in the credit supply. Thus, the extent of financial 
constraints during the crisis is a very special experience, something that comes close to a 
laboratory experiment, where the external shock imparted by the crisis induced a sudden 
and  likely  unexpected  contraction  in  the  credit  supply.  In  turn,  it  is  useful  to  assess 
whether the value of the MGI support eclipsed because of the crisis or it was still working 
at that time of utmost financial stress. 
To answer those research questions we use the credit files of a large commercial bank 
(UniCredit) taking two snapshots of them: at the end of December 2008 and at the end of 
March 2009. First, we build a proxy measure of credit constraints considering the ratio 
between the amount of credit effectively drawn by the enterprise and the amount of the 
credit limits the banks had granted to it. Namely, we classify as experiencing financial 
tension those enterprises that: i) had a very high value of such ratio by end December 
2008 and ii) suffered a significant increase in that ratio by end March 2009. Then, we 
study empirically whether and to what extent, controlling for other possible determinants, 
the probability of suffering financial tension was smaller for the firms assisted by MGIs. 
As regards our research questions, we reach the following results. First, we confirm that 
borrowing firms assisted by MGIs less likely experienced financial tension. Second, MGI 
assistance benefited more the borrowing firms with intermediate and low internal ratings 
whereas it did not matter so much for the companies enjoying higher ratings. Third, our 
results indicate that MGIs’ beneficial impact to reduce the probability of financial tension 
was significantly larger for the more opaque firms, namely those endowed with a shorter 
firm-bank relationship length. The second and third results together suggest that MGIs 
played a signalling role beyond the pure provision of guarantees. 
In the rest of the paper, section 2 presents a brief summary of the literature on the two 
aspects:  i)  the  impact  of  systemic  financial  crises  on  the  amplification  of  credit 
constraints  via  the  bank  lending  channel,  and  ii)  the  effect  of  MGI  assistance  at 
facilitating firms’ access to credit during normal times. The bulk of the paper consists of 
section 3, where we present our empirical analysis in detail. Finally, section 4 concludes 
highlighting  why  our  results  have  a  bearing  on  the  design  of  an  optimal  financial 
structure, particularly with a view at the small business segment. 
   3 
2  The literature background 
It  is  a  well  known  tenet  that  banks  exist  to  (partly)  overcome  the  information 
asymmetries between investors and borrowers. Building on the seminal paper by Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981), Diamond (1984) shows that savers/depositors delegate to banks the 
monitoring of borrowers. It follows from this that banks play a key function to remedy 
market  failures  in  the  credit  market  given  that,  by  accumulating  information  on 
borrowers, they may lower the extent of asymmetries in information and provide the 
borrowers  with  the  appropriate  incentives  to  tackle  the  adverse  selection  and  moral 
hazard problems. 
According to a bulky strand of the literature, banks perform the task above better if they 
engage  in  long-term  relationships  with  borrowers,  i.e.  if  they  follow  the  relationship 
banking model. Boot (2000) holds that relationship banking centers around two critical 
dimensions: the extraction of proprietary information from the borrower by the lender 
and the occurrence of multiple interactions between the two parties. As such, relationship 
banking  may  be  defined  as  “the  provision  of  financial  services  by  a  financial 
intermediary that: i. invests in obtaining customer-specific information, often proprietary 
in  nature;  and  ii.  evaluates  the  profitability  of  these  investments  through  multiple 
interactions with the same customer over time and/or across products”. This special status 
can facilitate a Pareto-improving exchange of information between the borrower and the 
bank. But relationship banking can also add value through several additional contractual 
welfare-improving enhancements: i) through flexibility and discretion, it can facilitate 
implicit long term contracting; ii) it may help controlling potential conflicts of interest; 
iii) it can improve the monitoring of collateral; iv) it may render feasible for the bank to 
make loans that would not be profitable from a short term perspective but may become 
profitable if the relationship with the borrower lasts long enough. 
But,  why  should  relationship  banking  be  most  valuable  during  financial  crises?  The 
answer depends on the fact that in those circumstances economies experience widespread 
distress. This implies that borrowers need financial assistance the most exactly when the 
economy is plundered by pervasive lack of liquidity. If this financial assistance is denied, 
many viable firms might become insolvent and become bankrupt, with large potential 
depletion of corporate value (Andrade and Kaplan, 1998). Which is then the link between 
relationship banking and distress? We find a rather general agreement that relationship 
banking may help deal with financial distress. 
Analyzing the case of Japanese firms, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990) show that 
the costs  borne to  overcome episodes  of financial distress  are significantly lower for 
firms enjoying long-standing relationships with a main bank. Kawai, Hashimoto, and 
Izumida  (1996)  find  that  the  main  bank  system  reduces  the  firm’s  financial  cost  for 
Japanese  firms  in  financial  distress.  Elsas,  and  Krahnen  (1998)  reach  analogous 
conclusions on German data: they unveil that housebanks provide liquidity insurance in 
situations of unexpected deterioration of borrower ratings. Building on the hypothesis 
that implicit contracts may characterize bank lending (Fried and Howitt, 1980), Berlin, 
and Mester (1998) find evidence that relationship banks smooth loan rates in response to 
exogenous shocks. They argue that loan rate smoothing is part of an optimal long-term 
contract between a bank and its borrower if it happens in response to interest rate shocks 
– but not in response to a credit risk. Examining micro-data on corporate borrowing in 
Italy during the episode of sharp monetary tightening in 1992 – aimed to resist the extant   4 
exchange rate crisis – Conigliani, Ferri, and Generale (1997) show that the intensity of 
lending rate increase and of credit constraints was higher the larger the number of lending 
banks. 
While  there  is  general  consensus  that  relationship  banking  should  be  most  valuable 
during financial crises, we need to make an important caveat. Specifically, as Berlin, and 
Mester  (1998)  also  show,  loan  rate  smoothing  –  and,  we  can  add,  the  provision  of 
liquidity insurance more in general  – reduces bank profits. This means that financial 
crises may impose a greater burden on relationship banks than on arm’s length banks. If 
one considers that such a burden is compounded with the accrual of increasing losses 
triggered by the crisis, this entails that the stability of (some) relationship banks may be at 
risk.  In  other  words,  there  is  a  limit  to  the  intertemporal  smoothing  and  liquidity 
insurance offered by  relationship banks.  And, in some cases,  relationship  banks  may 
become distressed. Should such occurrence materialize, borrowers would be hit by the 
curse  of  relationship  banking  rather  than  enjoying  its  benefits.  In  practice,  distressed 
relationship banks would be recalling their loans and their borrowers might be the least 
prepared to deal with such a situation. It may, in fact, be rather difficult for borrowers to 
substitute distressed relationship banks exactly at the time of a financial crisis.  
Ferri, Kang and Kim (2001) reach relevant findings in this respect. Studying the Korean 
crisis of 1997-98 they show that: i) outstanding loans plunge more for firms with weaker 
pre-crisis  relationship  banking;  ii)  also  the  drop  in  credit  lines  –  arguably  a  proxy 
identifying  shifts  in  the  loan  supply  –  is  larger  for  firms  relying  less  on  strong 
relationship  banking;  iii)  more  intense  pre-crisis  relationship  banking  reduces  the 
probability  that  a  previously  non-delinquent  firm  will  build  (increase  her)  loans  in 
arrears;  iv)  ceteris  paribus,  the  aforementioned  probability  depends  on  whether  firms 
were borrowing from one (or more) of the five banks foreclosed in June 1998, testifying 
that it may be particularly difficult for borrowers to substitute distressed lending banks 
during a financial crisis. 
Credit guarantee schemes have recently experienced renewed interest as a response to 
credit crunch in advanced economies (see for instance Honohan 2010). Columba et al. 
(2010)  provide  empirical  evidence  showing  that  even  young  small  firms,  with  little 
collateral  and  short  credit  relationships,  may  mitigate  their  borrowing  constraints  by 
joining MGIs. Members of MGIs contribute to a guarantee fund used as collateral for 
obtaining loans. Banks, especially large ones, appreciate this kind of lending technology 
as MGIs members are better informed about each member’s characteristics and behavior. 
Hence participation to  an MGI provides  a signaling effect  on firms  creditworthiness. 
Moreover, as MGIs members incur a penalty in case of default by a single member, 
members have an incentive to monitor each other (peer monitoring).
1  
However, to our  knowledge, little is known in the literature about  the role of  MGIs 
during financial crises. The present paper provides a first assessment for the Great Crisis 
of 2007-2009 and focuses on the lending practices followed by a large bank, for which 
asymmetric information problems with opaque borrowers are more severe compared to 
small territorial banks. 
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group of borrowers without collateral are linked by a joint responsibility clause. See also the literature 
reported in their article.    5 
3  Empirical evidence 
This section is divided into four parts. Subsection 3.1 is devoted to outline the definition 
of  the  data  sources,  of  the  variables  we  use  as  well  as  to  present  some  descriptive 
statistics. In subsection 3.2 we introduce our empirical model. Subsection 3.3 articulates 
our  main  results  while  subsection  3.4  reports  various  robustness  checks  to  further 
ascertain the strength of our results. 
3.1  Variables and descriptive statistics 
Data on firms are taken from the UniCredit loan portfolio of the Italian small business 
segment.
2  The sample used in the empirical analysis comprises around 77,000 firms, 
customers of the bank, and is based on the information available at the end of December 
2008 and at the end of March 2009. An important additional source of information for 
our dataset is represented by the Italian Credit Register, where banks can verify granted 
credit lines and actual utilization of credit lines with respect to the whole banking system 
for each customer.
3 
The dataset is obtained by treating a wider record file: we have filtered outliers and 
misreported  cases  from  the  Italian  Credit  Register;  we  have  also  dropped  all  the 
observations  for  whi ch  no  information  about  the  internal  rating  of  UniCredit  was 
available. The variables investigated are those reported in Table 1. 
The dependent variable is an indicator of financial tension. We define financial tension as 
a dichotomous variable taking value 1 if in December 2008 the firm was using more than 
70% of the credit lines granted by the banking system and subsequently, in March 2009, 
it was using more than 80%. This variable identifies firms in a situation of potential 
financial stress that during the crisis faced a worsening of their situation with an increase 
of at least 10% of the indicator of financial tension
4. 
In order to test the robustness of our definition of financial tension we consider as 
alternative dependent variable the rate of growth from December 2008 to March 2009 of 
the total granted credit line for the firm by the banking system. Having defined the 
indicator of financial tension in terms of the amount of the credit line used with respect to 
the amount granted, ceteris paribus, an increase of the granted credit line diminishes the 
risk of potential financial stress. 
The key explanatory variable is a dichotomous variable taking value 1 if the line of credit 
granted to the firm is backed by mutual guarantees. As discussed previously, MGIs may 
enhance the bank-firm relationship by favouring the access to bank loans for small firms 
with a limited collateral capacity, or characterized by the lack of a sufficient track record 
or credit history. Specifically, the MGI may reduce asymmetric information problems 
through members’ screening and monitoring activities on each other (peer monitoring), 
and/or can mitigate the risk borne by the bank by supplying financial guarantees (and in 
some cases  also  personal  and real  estate guarantees) that allow a partial coverage of 
                                                 
2 In the present analysis small business is defined as firms with turnover up to 5 million euros. 
3 Banks must report to the Italian Credit Register when: granted or actual short term credit lines are no less 
than 75,000 €, while bad loans or losses are reported regardless of the amount. 
4 The thresholds introduced are derived from heuristic evidence based on operational experie nce, and have 
been tested by means of a sensitivity analysis.    6 
potential losses. In the present sample 19% of firms had a guarantee posted by an MGI on 
a loan.
 5 
Moreover, we have added several control variables: 
-  the  firm’s  rating  according  to  the  UniCredit  internal  assessment  in  December 
2008.  The  original  values  have  been  rearranged  such  that  better  firms  are 
associated with higher values of the rating, with 1 being the worst (default) and 14 
being the best, and then taken in logarithms. We also construct three dichotomous 
variables  based  on  the  discrete  specification,  such  that  values  from  5  to  9 
correspond to bad quality firms, values from 10 to 12 correspond to intermediate 
quality firms, and values 13 and 14 correspond to high quality firms;
6 
-  the firm’s share of short-term loans from the banking system in December 2008; 
-  a proxy of the firm’s leverage, defined as the logarithm of the ratio of firm’s total 
loans from the banking system to firm’s sales in December 2008, which measures 
the firm's ability to repay debt; 
-  Corporation, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm is a limited liability 
company; 
-  Size, defined as the logarithm of the firm’s employees in December 2008; 
-  HHI, corresponding to the average value of the Herfindhal Hirschman index of 
concentration on bank loans in the province during 1991-1998 period;
7 
-  Growth, corresponding to the rate of growth of the provincial value added during 
the 1991-1998 period; 
-  North,  a  dummy  variable  taking  value  1  if  the  bank  branch  where  the  credit 
relationship takes place is located in Northern Italy (Emilia Romagna, Veneto, 
Friuli Venezia Giulia, Trentino Alto Adige, Lombardia, Piemonte, Val d'Aosta); 0 
otherwise; 
-  Agriculture, an industry dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm operates in 
Agriculture; 0 otherwise; 
-  Energy, an industry dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm operates in the 
Energy sector; 0 otherwise; 
-  Manufacturing, an industry dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm operates in 
the Manufacturing sector; 0 otherwise; 
-  Constructions, an industry dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm operates in 
the Constructions sector; 0 otherwise; 
-  Trade, an industry dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm operates in the Trade 
and repair sector; 0 otherwise; 
-  Other services, an industry dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm operates in 
the sector “Other services”; 0 otherwise. 
 
In order to estimate with Instrumental Variables techniques we consider the following set 
of instruments: 
                                                 
5 Columba et al. (2010) examine Italian small firms with less than 20 employees that received a loan in 
June 2005, 17% of which had a guarantee posted by an MGI on a loan.  
6 The worst quality firms, characterized by a rating from 1 to 4, are not informative for the analysis so these 
latter classes are not taken into consideration. 
7 These data are based on Bank of Italy statistics and we have used the values c omputed in Herrera and 
Minetti [2007].   7 
-  Branches per thousand inhabitants in the region in 1936; 
-  Number of saving banks per thousand inhabitants in the region in 1936;   
 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for all the variables included in the regressions 
presented in the paper. 
As it is possible to observe in Figure 1, the sector composition is affected by the nature of 
the sample. In fact, small firms are usually overrepresented in sectors such as Trade and 
Other Services compared to medium or large firms.  
 
3.2  The empirical model 
A situation of potential financial stress experienced by a firm can be modelled as: 
 
. 11 1 i i i i u x z y                                                       (1) 
 
where yi is the Financial Tension proxy experienced by firm i, zi is the vector of control 
variables, xi accounts for the presence of a MGI providing firm i with guarantees to be 
used  as  collateral  to  back  bank  loans  and  ui  is  the  vector  of  heteroskedastic-robust 
standard errors. 
Instrumental  variables  are  used  to  account  for  endogeneity  in  estimating  the  relation 
between a situation of financial tension and the presence of MGI guarantees. To fix ideas, 
think  of  the  two-stage  least  squares  interpretation  of  instrumental  variables  (IV, 
henceforth). First, we define a vector of instrumental variables that are correlated with the 
explanatory variable xi  X, but are uncorrelated with the error term in the regression (1). 
The  effect  of  these  instruments  on  xi  is  captured  by  the  parameters  in  the  following 
relationship equation: 
, 21 i i i v w x                                                          (2) 
                                                                                                          
where xi is the endogenous variable in (1), wi is the vector of instruments and vi is the 
stochastic error term. After estimating the first-stage regression (2) xi is replaced with the 
fitted values of xi in the second-stage regression (1). 
The set of instruments in the present empirical analysis are taken from Guiso, Sapienza 
and Zingales [2004]. In particular, we have a set of variables that describe the banking 
market in 1936, when a strict entry regulation was introduced: the number of branches 
per thousand inhabitants in  the  region  in 1936, and the number of saving banks  per 
thousand inhabitants in the region in 1936. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales [2004] have 
used  these  instruments  to  account  for  endogeneity  in  the  case  of  a  local  banking 
development indicator, taken as a regressor in a firm’s growth equation. Since the quality 
of  MGI  is  probably  related  to  banking  development,  we  use  an  analogous  set  of 
instruments.
8 
To ensure the validity of the chosen instruments we have to perform diagnostic checks. 
First of all, we consider the F-test of linear restrictions that the instruments are jointly 
                                                 
8 For a detailed discussion on the justification of these instruments, see Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 
[2004].   8 
significant. Then, for an excluded exogenous variable to be a good instrument, it must 
be sufficiently correlated with the included endogenous regressor and orthogonal to the 
error  term.  The  first-stage  regression  indicates  that  the  instrumental  variables  are 
correlated.  The  assumption  of  correlation  is  tested  with  an  F-test  of  the  excluded 
instruments that corresponds to Shea's (1997) “partial R-squared” measure of instrument 
relevance, that takes inter-correlations among instruments into account. The first-stage 
results  are  considered  with  small-sample  statistics,  to  be  consistent  with  the 
recommended use of the first-stage F-test as a diagnostic. As the estimated equation is 
reported  with  heteroskedastic-robust  standard  errors,  the  first-stage  F-test  is  also 
heteroskedastic-robust.  In  turn,  the  assumption  of  orthogonality  to  the  error  term  is 
tested  using  the  Hansen-Sargan  over-identification  test.  Tests  of  over-identifying 
restrictions actually check also whether the equation is misspecified, meaning that one 
or  more  of  the  excluded  exogenous  variables  should  be  included  in  the  structural 
equation.  Hence,  a  rejection  of  the  Hansen-Sargan  over-identification  test  can  be 
interpreted as either having invalid instruments and/or incorrect model specification. 
We also report a test of endogeneity for the instrumented variable, in order to check 
whether the variable presumed to be endogenous in the OLS model could instead be 
treated as exogenous. If the null hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected, then the 
OLS estimator is more efficient, and should be used instead. Under the null hypothesis 
that the specified endogenous regressor can actually be treated as exogenous, the test 
statistic is distributed as a chi-squared with a number of degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of regressors tested. The endogeneity test is implemented like the C statistic, 
defined as the difference of two Hansen-Sargan statistics: one for the equation with the 
smaller set of instruments, where the suspect regressor is treated as endogenous, and one 
for the equation with the larger set of instruments, where the suspect regressor is treated 
as  exogenous.  Under  conditional  homoskedasticity,  this  endogeneity  test  statistic  is 
numerically equal to the Hausman test statistic (see Hayashi, 2000). 
Unfortunately, the IV estimation method relies on the assumption of a linear probability 
model  for  mutual  guarantees  influencing  the  financial  tension  experienced  by  firms. 
Therefore we also provide the estimates derived from a conditional maximum likelihood 
(IV-Probit)  technique  proposed  in  Wooldridge  (2002)  which  does  not  require  the 
assumption of a linear probability model. This technique uses maximum likelihood to 
estimate a probit model in the presence of an endogenous variable. We report a Wald test 
of endogeneity for the instrumented variable, i.e. an MGI backing firms’ loans. Under the 
null  hypothesis  that  the  specified  endogenous  regressor  can  actually  be  treated  as 
exogenous, the test statistic is distributed as a chi-squared with one degree of freedom. 
 
3.3  Findings 
We  examine  six  different  specifications.  First  of  all,  we  use  the  following  baseline 
equation: 
Financial  tension  =    +  1  MGIi  +  2Rating  +  3  Share  of  short  term  loansi  +  4  Leveragei  + 




ij jSector  + ui                                  (3) 
   9 
where i = 1, …, N  represents the firm, and j = 1, …, 5 is the economic activity sector.  
 
The financial tension experienced by firm i depends on both firm and local economy 
characteristics. We consider as explanatory variable the affiliation with an MGI (dummy 
MGI), and take as control variables the following firm characteristics: the rating assigned 
(Rating), the share of short-term loans received from the banking system (Share of short 
term  loans), the ratio of total  loans to  sales (Leverage), the limited liability (dummy 
Corporation), the number of employees (Size), the geographical location (dummy North), 
and the activity sector (one dummy variable for each sector considered). Local economy 
characteristic are the degree of concentration on bank loans in the province (HHI) and the 
rate of growth of provincial value added (Growth). 
Results by OLS and Probit are reported in Table 4. In both cases, the 1 coefficient 
indicates  that  firms  guaranteed  by  MGIs  have  a  higher  probability  of  experiencing 
financial tension than those not associated with an MGI. The sign of the coefficient is not 
the one we expect, but this counterintuitive finding can be rationalized in the light of an 
endogeneity problem: on one hand, firms supported by MGIs experience less difficulties 
in obtaining loans; on the other hand, firms join an MGI since they actually experience 
difficulties in obtaining loans. 
In order to control for this endogenity problem we estimate with IV techniques. The 
first-stage regression (eq. 3a reported in Table 5) shows that we can reject the null that 
the chosen instruments are jointly not significant in the equation of financial tension (eq. 
3b reported in Table 6): the F-statistic on the F-test on linear restriction is significant at 
less than 1% confidence level. Moving to the second-stage regression, the results of the 
test of exogeneity in the 2SLS estimation establish the need for an IV approach. In fact, 
the F-test of excluded instruments confirms that the instrumental variables considered 
are correlated with the endogeous regressor MGI.
9 Second, the result on the χ
2-statistic 
on the Hansen-Sargan over-identification states that the null of either having invalid 
instruments  and/or incorrect  model specification can be rejected.  Finally, the  test  of 
endogeneity for the instrumented variable rejects the null that the MGI variable could be 
treated as exogenous in the OLS estimation. 
Consider now the effect of an MGI backing firms’ loans. Contrary to  the OLS and 
Probit estimation, which, as shown above, are affected by endogeneity problems, the IV 
estimation  confirms  the  importance  of  MGI  in  reducing  the  probability  of  financial 
tension. In fact, the estimated coefficient of MGI is negative and significant at less than 
the 1% confidence level. However, the IV estimation method relies on the assumption of 
a linear probability model. Therefore, in Table 6 we also provide the estimates derived 
from a conditional maximum likelihood (IV-Probit) estimation, which does not impose 
the assumption of a linear probability model (eqs. 4 to 6). 
Besides the baseline equation, which features MGI as explanatory variable (eq. 4), we 
study how the probability of experiencing financial tension changes when the guarantee 
is  associated  to  an  intermediate  or  bad  quality  firm  (eq.  5  and  eq.  6,  respectively). 
Replacing  the  explanatory  variable  MGI  with  the  two  corresponding  interaction 
variables, the baseline equation hence becomes: 
                                                 
9 Specifically, the F-statistic equal to 490.52, with a p-value of 0.0000. Stock, Wright and Yogo [2002] 
suggest that the F-statistic should exceed 10 for inference based on the 2SLS estimator to be reliable where 
there is only one endogenous regressor.   10 
Financial tension =  + 1 MGIi  intermediate quality firmi + 2Rating + 3 Share of short term loansi + 




ij jSector  + ui            (3a) 
and: 
Financial  tension  =    +  1  MGIi    bad  quality  firmi  +  2Rating  +  3  Share  of  short  term  loansi  +               




ij jSector  + ui            (3b) 
 
In all three specifications, the Wald test confirms that the instrumented regressor should 
be treated as endogenous, and the 1 coefficient is negative and significant at less than 
1%  confidence  level.  However,  since  the  IV-probit  estimates  are  not  linear,  for 
comparison purpose we have to compute marginal effects (Table 7). MGIs turn out more 
effective in reducing the probability of experiencing financial tension when associated 
with  intermediate  and  bad  quality  firms.  During  the  crisis  asymmetric  information 
problems have been exacerbated, so that the signals typically embedded in scoring and 
rating systems to assess credit worthiness have become less informative, since typically 
based on pro-cyclical indicators. Our findings show that MGIs played an important role 
during the crisis in relaxing asymmetric information problems for intermediate and low 
quality firms, allowing them to reduce the probability of experiencing financial tension 
and to increase granted credit. In particular, the MGI assistance was more important for 
firms with intermediate and low internal rating whereas it did not matter so much for 
firms having a high rating. 
Now,  given that MGIs  are most valuable for small  firms  during financial crises,  as 
shown above, is the rationale for this finding to be found in their capacity to convey  
signal to banks about their members creditworthiness or in their capacity to provide a 
guarantee fund for the group of members lacking collateral?  
In order to examine this issue we split the sample into two subsamples, with respect to 
the median value of the length of the bank-firm relationship, in our sample equal to 4.28 
years. In fact, a long-term relation of the firm with its main bank may be important in 
reducing the extent of information asymmetry. By distinguishing between long-term and 
short-term bank-firm relationships we can study the signalling effect of MGIs in the two 
subsamples.  
The corresponding IV-probit estimations are reported in Table 8. In order to maintain 
internal consistency, the set of instruments used is the same of previous regressions. 
First of all, we consider the relationship length (taken in logarithms) as explanatory 
variable instead of MGIs, and analyze its impact over the probability of experiencing 
financial tension. The equation we estimate is the following: 
Financial tension =  + 1 Relationship length with the Banki + 2Rating + 3 Share of short term loansi + 




ij jSector  + ui            (4) 
 
As expected, the 1 coefficient is negative and significant at less than 1% confidence 
level (eq. 7, in Table 8). Having confirmed the role of long-term relationships with the 
bank in reducing the probability of financial tension, we then re-estimate our baseline 
specifications (3), distinguishing between long-term and short-term relationships (eq. 8   11 
and 9, respectively), where the threshold is given by the median value of the relationship 
length with the bank, equal to 4.28 years. Despite having the correct sign, the coefficient 
associated with MGIs is not significant when considering the long-term relationships 
sub-sample. On the contrary, it becomes significant at less than 1% confidence level in 
the short-term sub-sample, which confirms our hypothesis. During extreme financial 
crises, asymmetric information problems entail that in the presence of a short-term bank-
firm relationship, MGIs play a signalling role that goes beyond the pure provision of 
guarantees. 
 
3.4  Robustness analysis 
As the definition of financial tension is somehow arbitrary although logically grounded, 
we  test  the  robustness  of  our  findings  by  considering  a  variable  indirectly  linked  to 
financial tension. Specifically, we consider as endogenous variable the rate of growth 
from December 2008 to March 2009 of the total line of credit granted to the firm by the 
banking system. Having defined the indicator of financial tension in terms of the amount 
of the credit line used with respect to the amount granted, ceteris paribus, an increase of 
the granted credit line diminishes the risk of potential financial stress. Given that it was 
very difficult for banks to extend new credit lines and/or amplify the existing ones during 
the period examined,  hence the benefits  arising  from  MGIs  are now confirmed by  a 
positive impact on the dependent variable. The findings of this exercise are reported in 
Table 9. First of all, we use the following baseline equation: 
Growth of the granted credit line =  + 1 MGIi + 2Rating + 3 Share of short term loansi + 4 Leveragei 




ij jSector  + ui                               (5) 
 
Also  in  this  case the sign of the 1  coefficient in  the OLS  estimate  may  reveal  an 
endogenity problem, and the results of the tests in the 2SLS estimations (eq. 10 to 16) 
support the need for an IV approach. The set of instruments is the same used in the 
previous analysis. 
Consider then the 2SLS estimations. First of all, we work on the baseline equation by 
replacing  the  variable  MGI  with  two  interaction  variables  which  jointly  feature  the 
presence of an MGI and an intermediate (eq. 12) or bad quality firm (eq. 13). In this two 
latter  cases,  the  size  of  the  1  estimated  coefficient  is  larger  compared  to  the  result 
obtained in the equation featuring MGI only. This seems to confirm the importance of 
MGIs in favouring the access to bank loans for small firms with a limited collateral 
capacity,  or  characterized  by  the  lack  of  a  sufficient  track  record  or  credit  history. 
However, note that the rating has a positive impact on the growth of the granted credit 
line only when worse customers are considered, and still the coefficient is not significant 
(eq. 13). The crisis imparts a negative shock characterized by a shortage of liquidity, and 
firms with lower ratings are the ones likely asking for more credit, resulting thereby the 
more financed. Differently put, during the crisis a “demand effect” is at work, which 
contrasts  the  traditional  “credit  worthiness  effect”,  inserting  a  bias  in  the  analysis. 
Equations 14 to 16 support this reasoning. In fact, once we replace the rating variable 
with the two dummies, identifying respectively an intermediate or bad quality firms with   12 
respect to the rating associated, the signs of the coefficients become positive within each 
cluster of rating. Specifically, the estimated equation is: 
Growth of the granted credit line =  + 1 MGIi + 2 Intermediate quality firm + 3 bad quality firm  +         





ij jSector  + ui                                                                                                                 (6) 
 
The 1, 2  and 3  coefficient are positive, and significant at less than 1% confidence level. 
Moreover,  the  coefficient  associated  to  bad  quality  firms  is  bigger  than  the  one 
associated to intermediate quality firms. Clusters of rating render explicit the situation 
the market faces during the crisis: thanks to MGIs, lower rated firms turn out to have 
more credit, having asked for more. Once we consider the interaction variables instead 
of accounting for the presence of an MGI only, the phenomenon is even more evident 
(eq. 15 and 16). Whereas  the single dummy is not  significant  per se, when already 
captured on the explanatory variable, the other one has a coefficient significant at less 
than 1%, an with the expected positive sign. 
Summing up, the robustness check confirms the importance of MGIs in favouring the 
access to bank loans for small firms with a limited collateral capacity, or characterized 
by the lack of a sufficient track record or credit history. In harsh times MGIs allow to 
reduce asymmetric information problems, providing a signalling effect that counts more 
than the simple guarantee itself. This is especially true for intermediate quality firms. 
That is, firms maybe creditworthy, but damaged by the shortage of liquidity generated 
by the crisis. 
 
4  Conclusions 
The Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 imparted an exogenous, likely unanticipated, 
shock on the macroeconomy. In particular, the crisis dried up liquidity sources for the 
banking system while, at the same time, it worsened business prospects in the economy at 
large. As such, the peak of the crisis provides a unique vantage point for the researchers 
aiming to investigate how financial constraints aggravate. Following the widely studied 
literature on the credit channel of transmission of monetary and financial shocks, we 
expect that, in those circumstances, financial constraints will amplify principally for the 
small businesses. By and large, the small-sized enterprises are, in fact, the ones suffering 
the most severe  asymmetry  of information  vis-à-vis  lenders and, so,  the lenders will 
naturally  tend  to  place  on  them  overwhelmingly  the  burden  of  their  crisis-provoked, 
selected stiffening in credit supply. 
In this paper we studied whether the assistance of Mutual Guarantee Institutions (MGIs) 
can offer small businesses a shield against aggravating credit constraints. Specifically, we 
asked two questions. First, as previous literature has shown that MGI support may ease 
financial constraints for small-sized enterprises in normal times, is that mechanism still 
functioning during the harsh times of a systemic crisis? And, second, if so, through which 
particular channel does the MGI’s assistance benefit the small businesses? As to the first 
question, our results confirm that MGI assistance proved if anything even more important 
during the dire straits of the crisis. Regarding the second question, we showed that MGIs 
played a signalling role beyond the pure provision of guarantees.   13 
Therefore,  our  empirical  evidence  suggests  that  the  presence  of  MGIs  constitutes  an 
important component of the financial system to tame the malfunctioning of credit markets 
at the time of systemic crises. Accordingly, since the episodes of instability have by far 
intensified within the financially liberalised environment of the recent decades, it appears 
desirable for countries to be able deploying MGIs to help the small businesses weather 
the negative consequences of those recurrent crises. 
Finally, we can envisage two possible directions to be investigated. First, building on the 
detailed taxonomy of SME lending provided by Berger and Udell (2006), it would be 
interesting to ascertain whether the introduction of MGIs as a lending facilitator between 
the  bank  and  the  firm  could  itself  provide  a  new  twist  to  the  available  lending 
technologies. For instance, it might turn out that, thanks to the support of MGIs, even 
transactional banks could be able to lend to opaque firms normally thought to fall in the 
domain of relational banks. Second, it could be worth investigating whether the presence 
of MGIs as ancillary counterparts in SME lending brings about a change in the bank’s 
organizational model, possibly favoring convergence across different types of banks. We 
leave these questions for future research. 
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Table 1. Variables: definition and source 
 
Variable   Definition 
Financial Tension  Takes value 1 if in December 2008 the firm was using more than 70% of its 
line of credit granted by the banking system and subsequently in March 
2009 it was using more than 80% (i.e. an increase of more than 10%). It 
takes value 0 otherwise 
Growth of granted line of 
credit  
Rate of growth from December 2008 to March 2009 of the total granted 
line of credit for the firm for the banking system. 
MGI  Dummy variable taking value 1 if the line of credit granted to the firm is 
backed by a Mutual Guarantees Institution 
Rating  Log of the firm’s rating, a discrete variable taking value 1 for customers 
with the highest probability of default and 14 for those with the lowest 
probability of default 
Intermediate quality firm  Dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm belongs to discrete rating classes 
from 10 to 12 
Bad quality firm  Dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm belongs to discrete rating classes 
from 5 to 9 
MGI    intermediate 
quality firms 
Interaction between MGI and intermediate quality firm  
MGI  bad quality firms  Interaction between MGI and bad quality firm  
Relationship  Length  with 
the Bank  
Log of the number of years of the relationship between the firm and the 
bank 
Share  of  Short-Term 
Loans  
Firm’s share of short-term loans over the total (short & long-term) granted 
to it by the banking system as of end December 2008 
Leverage   Log of the ratio of firm’s total used loans from the banking system to firm’s 
sales as of end December 2008 
Corporation  Dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm is a limited liability company; 0 
otherwise 
Size  Log of the firm’s number of employees as of end December 2008 
HHI   Average value of the Herfindhal Hirschman index of concentration on bank 
loans in the province during 1991-1998 period 
Growth  Rate of growth of the provincial value added during 1991-1998 period 
North  Dummy  variable  taking  value  1  if  the  bank  branch  where  the  credit 
relationship  with  the  firm  takes  place  is  located  in  Northern  Italy;  0 
otherwise 
Agriculture  Dummy  variable  taking  value  1  if  the  firm  belongs  to  the  Agriculture 
industry; 0 otherwise 
Energy  Dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm belongs to the Energy industry; 
0 otherwise 
Manufacturing  Dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm belongs to the Manufacturing 
industry; 0 otherwise   17 
Constructions  Dummy  variable  taking  value  1  value  1  if  the  firm  belongs  to  the 
Constructions industry; 0 otherwise 
Trade  Dummy variable taking value 1 value 1 if the firm belongs to the Trade and 
repair industry; 0 otherwise 
Other services  Dummy variable taking value 1 value 1 if the firm belongs to the Other 
services industry; 0 otherwise 
Branches  Branches per thousands inhabitants in the region in 1936 
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Table 2. Summary statistics  
 






                 
Financial Tension 
  0.0000  0.0713  0.0000  1.0000  0.2574 
Growth of granted line of credit   0.0000  0.4101  -0.3693  7.5882  2.7607 
MGI   0.0000  0.1957  0.0000  1.0000  0.3967 
Rating  2.3979  2.3262  1.3863  2.6390  0.3338 
Relationship Length with the Bank  1.4532  1.3066  -1.4691  3.0598  0.8655 
Share of Short Term Loans 
  0.7760  0.6975  0.0287  1.0000  0.3131 
Leverage 
  -1.1005  -1.1795  -4.7493  1.9445  1.2263 
Corporation 
  0.0000  0.1323  0.0000  1.0000  0.3388 
Size 
  0.0000  0.0773  0.0000  2.7080  0.4355 
HHI  0.0644  0.0718  0.0362  0.1963  0.0293 
Growth  0.0558  0.0680  -0.1241  0.2702  0.0578 
North 
  1.0000  0.6394  0.0000  1.0000  0.4802 






Table 3. Correlation matrix  
 
  Financial 
Tension 
Growth of the 
granted line of 
credit 






Leverage  Corporation  Size  HHI  Growth  North 
                               
Financial Tension  1.0000                       
Growth of the granted 
line of credit   -0.0002  1.0000     
 
             
MGI   0.0298  -0.0386  1.0000                   
Rating  -0.1653  -0.0375  -0.0166  1.0000                 
Relationship Length 
with the Bank  -0.0273  -0.0181  0.0624  0.02184  1.0000               
Share of Short Term 
Loans  -0.0075  0.0806  -0.1750  -0.0426  0.0043  1.0000             
Leverage  0.0730  -0.1644  0.1135  -0.1425  -0.0370  -0.4366  1.0000           
Corporation  0.0161  0.0109  0.0066  0.0089  0.0529  -0.0208  0.0306  1.0000         
Size  -0.0096  -0.0097  -0.0075  0.0238  -0.0020  -0.0144  0.0007  -0.0456  1.0000       
HHI  0.0286  -0.0024  0.0094  -0.0788  -0.0425  0.0098  -0.0286  0.0075  -0.0047  1.0000     
Growth  -0.0137  -0.0042  -0.0233  0.0690  0.0686  0.0073  -0.0152  0.0047  0.0024  -0.1829  1.0000   
North  -0.0390  -0.0085  0.0815  0.1726  0.1308  -0.0323  0.0482  0.0272  -0.0006  -0.3533  0.2205  1.0000 
 
 




Table 4. Determinants of Financial Tension.  
 
   OLS (Eq. 1)  Probit (Eq. 2) 
MGI  0.017***  0.137*** 
   0..003  0.018 
Rating   -0.116***  -0.632*** 
    0.004  0.018 
Share of Short Term Loans  0.014***  0.172*** 
   0.003  0.028 
Leverage  0.013***  0.128*** 
   0.001  0.007 
Corporation  0.01***  0.073*** 
   0.003  0.023 
Size  -0.002  -0.025 
   0.002  0.019 
HHI  0.114***  0.781*** 
  0.039  0.266 
Growth  0.015  0.068 
  0.017  0.142 
North  -0.006**  -0.065*** 
   0.002  0.017 
Energy  0.007  0.06 
   0.0.25  0.159 
Manufacturing  -0.03***  -0.235*** 
   0.009  0.056 
Construction  -0.013  -0.081 
   0.009  0.058 
Trade  -0.004  -0.011 
   0.009  0.056 
Other Services  -0.006  -0.026 
   0.009  0.056 
     
Constant  0.352***  0.015 
   0.014  0.075 
     
Observations  66148  66148 
F-test, F-statistic  112.49***   
Wald Test, 
2-statistic    2239.92*** 
 
NOTES: The endogenous variable is a dummy with value 1 if the firm experiences a situation of financial 
tension  in  December  2008  which  worsens  in  March  2009,  0  otherwise.  For  the  definition  of  the 
explanatory  variables  see  Table  1.  Robust  standard  errors  are  reported  below  coefficients.  (*): 
coefficient  significant  at  10  percent;  (**):  coefficient  significant  at  5  percent;  (***):  coefficient 
significant at less than 1% confidence level. The table also reports, as goodness-of-fit tests, the F-statistic 
for an F-test in the OLS estimation (eq. 1) and the 









Table 5. Determinants of firms’ participation to a MGI (first stage regression).  
 
   OLS (Eq. 3a) 
Instrumental variables   
Branches  0.063*** 
  0.017 
Saving banks  17.271*** 
  0.615 
Exogenous variables   
Rating   -0.052*** 
    0.005 
Share of Short Term Loans  -0.206*** 
   0.006 
Leverage  0.008*** 
   0.001 
Corporation  0.005 
   0.005 
Size  -0.006* 
   0.003 
HHI  0.643*** 
  0.056 
Growth  -0.356*** 
  0.033 
North  0.073*** 
   0.01714*** 
Energy  0.06** 
   0.0.3 
Manufacturing  0.115*** 
   0.01 
Construction  0.082*** 
   0.01 
Trade  0.07*** 
   0.01 
Other Services  0.052*** 
   0.01 
   
Constant  0.257*** 
   0.016 
   
Observations  66148 
F-statistic  313.88*** 
F-test of linear restrictions on 
instruments  808.23*** 
 
NOTES: The endogenous variable is the natural logarithm of the firm’s rating. For the definition of the 
explanatory  variables  see  Table  1.  Robust  standard  errors  are  reported  below  coefficients.  (*): 
coefficient significant at 10% confidence level; (**): coefficient significant at 5% confidence level; (***): 
coefficient significant at less than 1% confidence level. The table also reports, as goodness-of-fit test, the 
F-statistic for an F-test.  
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Table 6. Determinants of Financial Tension.  
 
  






MGI  -0.064***  -0.564***     
   0.02  0..142     
MGI  intermediate quality firms      -1.759***   
      0.361   
MGI  bad quality firms        -1.903*** 
        0.415 
Rating  -0.119***   -0.638***  -0.462***  -1.009*** 
   0.004   0.018  0.056  0.066 
Share of Short Term Loans  -0.003  0.019  0.035  0.02 
   0.005  0.042  0.036  0.039 
Leverage  0.014***  0.131***  0.141***  0.119*** 
   0.001  0.007  0.006  0.008 
Corporation  0.01***  0.074***  0.079***  0.069*** 
   0.003  0.022  0.021  0.021 
Size  -0.003  -0.031*  -0.034**  -0.023 
   0.002  0.019  0.017  0.017 
HHI  0.157***  1.083***  1.172***  0.911*** 
  0.042  0.262  0.243  0.243 
Growth  -0.004  -0.099  -0.117  -0.024 
  0.018  0.142  0.131  0.129 
North  0.001  -0.006  -0.007  0.006 
   0.003  0.021  0.019  0.021 
Energy  0.010  0.091  0.142  0.066 
   0.025  0.155  0.144  0.143 
Manufacturing  -0.21**  -0.146***  -0.112**  -0.136** 
   0.009  0.056  0.057  0.056 
Construction  -0.006  -0.021  -0.004  -0.023 
   0.009  0.057  0.054  0.054 
Trade  0.001  0.036  0.054  0.040 
   0.009  0.055  0.051  0.051 
Other Services  -0.001  0.011  0.029  0.022 
   0.009  0.055  0.051  0.052 
         
Constant  0.376***  0.23***  -0.034  1.199*** 
   0.015  0.085  0.07  0.247 
         
Observations  66148  66148  66148  66148 
Wald Test, 
2-statistic  1520.70***  2379.07***  3539.76***  2427.10*** 
Test of excluded instruments, F-statistic  490.54***       
Endogeneity test of instrumented 
regressor , 
2-statistic  16.49***  22.47***  19.77***  20.67*** 
Overidentification test, Hansen J-statistic  1.98***       
 
NOTES: The endogenous variable is a dummy with value 1 if the firm experiences a situation of financial 
tension  in  December  2008  which  worsens  in  March  2009,  0  otherwise.  For  the  definition  of  the 
explanatory  variables  see  Table  1.  Robust  standard  errors  are  reported  below  coefficients.  (*): 
coefficient significant at 10% confidence level; (**): coefficient significant at 5% confidence level; (***): 
coefficient significant at less than 1% confidence level. The table also reports, as goodness-of-fit tests, the 

2-statistic for a Wald test. For the other diagnostic tests reported in the table see Section 3.3.    23 










(i)  -0.059***      
   0.014      
MGI  intermediate quality firms 
(i)    -0.115***   
    0.023   
MGI  bad quality firms 
(i)      -0.108*** 
      0.019 
Rating  -0.085***  -0.076***  -0.162*** 
   0.003   0.003  0.026 
Share of Short Term Loans  0.002  0.006  0.003 
   0.005  0.005  0.006 
Leverage  0.018***  0.023***  0.019*** 
   0.001  0.002  0.001 
Corporation 
(i)  0.010***  0.013***  0.011*** 
   0.003  0.004  0.004 
Size  -0.004*  -0.006*  -0.004 
   0.002  0.003  0.003 
HHI  0.145***  0.194***  0.146*** 
  0,036  0.049  0.042 
Growth  -0.013  -0.0194  -0.004 
  0,019  0.022  0.021 
North 
(i)  -0.001  -0.001  0.001 
   0.003  0.003  0.003 
Energy 
(i)  0.013  0.026  0.011 
   0.024  0.029  0.025 
Manufacturing 
(i)  -0.019***  -0.018**  -0.021*** 
   0.007  0.008  0.008 
Construction 
(i)  -0.003  -0.001  -0.003 
   0.007  0.009  0.008 
Trade 
(i)  0.005  0.009  0.006 
   0.007  0.009  0.008 
Other Services 
(i)  0.001  0.005  0.003 
   0.007  0.009  0.008 
 
 
NOTES: The endogenous variable is a dummy with value 1 if the firm experiences a situation of financial 
tension  in  December  2008  which  worsens  in  March  2009,  0  otherwise.  For  the  definition  of  the 
explanatory  variables  see  Table  1.  Robust  standard  errors  are  reported  below  coefficients.  (*): 
coefficient significant at 10% confidence level; (**): coefficient significant at 5% confidence level; (***): 
coefficient significant at less than 1% confidence level.  
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Long-term 
relationship 
(> 4.28 years) 
Short-term 
relationship 
(≤ 4.28 years) 
MGI 
    -0.187  -0.806***  
     0.207   0.197 
Relationship Length with the Bank  -0.541***     
  0.112     
Rating  -0.289***  -0.643***  -0.646*** 
   0.089  0.028  0.025 
Share of Short Term Loans  0.146***  0.174***  -0.098* 
   0.025  0.060  0.058 
Leverage  0.112***  0.147***  0.118*** 
   0.009  0.011  0.009 
Corporation   0.136***  0.091***  0.056* 
   0.024  0.031  0.032 
Size  -0.027  -0.015  -0.043* 
   0.017  0.028  0.025 
HHI  0.939***  1.292***  0.746** 
  0.243  0.420  0.337 
Growth  0.326**  0.155  -0.323 
  0.143  0.200  0.202 
North   0.043  -0.016  -0.160 
   0.026  0.034  0.025 
Energy   0.089  -0.128  0.308 
   0.146  0.240  0.210 
Manufacturing   -0.174***  -0.276***  -0.048 
   0.054  0.085  0.077 
Construction   -0.065  -0.133  0.056 
   0.053  0.086  0.076 
Trade   0.020  -0.044  0.099 
   0.052  0.082  0.074 
Other Services   0.016  -0.075  0.089 
   0.053  0.081  0.074 
       
Constant   -0.023  0.092  0.372*** 
  0.070  0.122  0.124 
       
Observations  66148  33107  33041 
Wald Test, 
2-statistic  3286.63***  1077.40***  1256.89*** 
Endogeneity test of instrumented 
regressor , 
2-statistic  17.43***  2.30  20.16*** 
 
 
NOTES: The endogenous variable is a dummy with value 1 if the firm experiences a situation of financial 
tension  in  December  2008  which  worsens  in  March  2009,  0  otherwise.  For  the  definition  of  the 
explanatory  variables  see  Table  1.  Robust  standard  errors  are  reported  below  coefficients.  (*): 
coefficient significant at 10% confidence level; (**): coefficient significant at 5% confidence level; (***): 
coefficient significant at less than 1% confidence level.  
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Table 9. Determinants of the growth of the granted line of credit  
 
   OLS (Eq. 10)  IV (eq. 11)  IV (Eq. 12)  IV (Eq. 13)  IV (eq. 14)  IV (Eq. 15)  IV (Eq. 16) 
MGI  -0.129***  0.811***      1.054***     
   0.0129  0.246      0.247     
MGI  intermediate quality firms      2.651***      2.598***   
      0.831      0.622   
MGI  bad quality firms        2.834***      3.706*** 
        0.877      0.903 
Rating  -0.514***  -0.476***  -0.650***  0.148       
  0.333  0.032  0.063  0.196       
Intermediate quality firms          0.441***  -0.066  0.395*** 
          0.024  0.121  0.026 
Bad quality firms          0.679***  0.68***  -0.136 
          0.034  0.034  0.2 
Share of Short Term Loans  0.034**  0.233***  0.195***  0.225***  0.186***  0.173***  0.209*** 
   0.029  0.056  0.049  0.056  0.056  0.055  0.064 
Leverage  -0.419***  -0.429***  -0.463***  -0.423***  -0.467***  -0.473***  -0.453*** 
   0.019  0.019  0.025  0.019  0.021  0.021  0.02 
Corporation  0.140***  0.135***  0.117**  0.134***  0.138***  0.129**  0.125** 
   0.049  0.049  0.052  0.050  0.049  0.05  0.051 
Size  -0.043**  -0.034*  -0.025  -0.041**  -0.022  -0.023  -0.034* 
   0.019  0.019  0.020  0.019  0.019  0.019  0.02 
HHI  -0.715*  -1.213***  -1.476***  -1.088***  -1.290***  -1.385***  -1.235*** 
  0.381  0.379  0.412  0.388  0.383  0.394  0.402 
Growth  -0.343*  0.118  -0.087  -0.210  0.034  -0.055  -0.129 
  0.181  0.132  0.204  0.191  0.195  0.193  0.191 
North  0.051**  -0.025  -0.017  -0.040  -0.003  -0.007  -0.032 
   0.022  0.032  0.031  0.036  0.032  0.033  0.039 
Energy  -0.552***  -0.595***  -0.679***  -0.568***  -0.594***  -0.664***  -0.573*** 
   0.13  0.133  0.149  0.140  0.135  0.145  0.147 
Manufacturing  -0.433***  -0.551***  -0.573***  -0.547***  -0.561***  -0.568***  -0.561*** 
   0.109  0.114  0.117  0.115  0.115  0.116  0.116 
Construction  -0.31***  -0.386***  -0.405***  -0.383***  -0.422***  -0.42***  -0.403*** 
   0.113  0.115  0.117  0.116  0.115  0.116  0.117 
Trade  -0.512***  -0.574***  -0.603***  -0.585***  -0.591***  -0.596***  -0.61*** 
   0.112  0.115  0.119  0.117  0.115  0.116  0.119 
Other Services  -0.083  -0.131  -0.157  -0.148  -0.155  -0.154  -0.178 
   0.112  0.114  0.116  0.115  0.114  0.114  0.117 
               
Constant  1.483  1.200***  1.584***  -0.243  -0.352***  -0.104  -0.078 
   0.139  0.147  0.154  0.518  0.125  0.115  0.118 
Observations  66148  66148  66148  66148  66148  66148  66148 
F.test, F-statistic
  49.42***             
Wald Test, 
2-statistic  -  685.91***  669.21***  670.91***  702.59***  696.90***  681.16*** 
Test of excluded instruments, F-statistic  -  490.54***  91.31***  109.30***  476.01***  178.83***  112.78*** 
Endogeneity test of instrumented 
regressor , 
2-statistic  -  14.91***  11.14***  12.51***  23.26***  2080.59***  21.81*** 
Overidentification test, Hansen J-statistic  -  0.02***  0.31***  0.05***  0.06***  0.19***  0.16*** 
 
NOTES: The endogenous variable is the rate of growth from December 2008 to March 2009 of the total granted credit line for the 
firm for the banking system. For the definition of the explanatory variables see Table 1. Robust standard errors are reported below 
coefficients.  (*):  coefficient  significant  at  10  %  confidence  level;  (**):  coefficient  significant  at  5%  confidence  level;  (***): 
coefficient significant at less than 1% confidence level. The table also reports, as goodness-of-fit tests, the F-statistic for an F-test in 
the OLS estimation (eq. 7) and the 
2-statistic for a Wald test in the IV-Probit estimation (eq. 8 to 13). For the other diagnostic tests 





Figure 1. Industry distribution of the sample  
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